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Cass R. Sunsteint
There are deep and fundamental and intuitively understood
grounds for rejecting the view that confines itself merely to
checking the parity of outcomes, the view that matches
death for death, happiness for happiness, fulfillment for
fulfillment, irrespective of how all this death, happiness and
fulfillment comes about.
Amartya Sen'
I. THE PROBLEM
The fiftieth anniversary of the Administrative Procedure
Act2 arrives at a time when administrative institutions are re-
ceiving more serious public attention than in any period since the
New Deal. The New Deal was committed to immensely strength-
ened national institutions and to large and largely independent
bureaucratic entities? These commitments are now under severe
strain. Much of this was signalled by the election of President
Reagan in 1980 and, in particular, by his promulgation of a con-
troversial executive order calling for attention to the costs and
benefits of regulatory initiatives.4 In 1993, it was firmly estab-
lished that a new direction had been set, when President Clinton
issued a new executive order that substantially overlapped with
President Reagan's.5
t Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of
Chicago, Law School and Department of Political Science. I am grateful to Richard
Craswell, Frank Easterbrook, and Richard Posner for helpful comments; to Jonathan
Wiener for helpful discussion; to participants in a work-in-progress lunch at the Uni-
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1 Amartya Sen, Freedoms and Needs: An argument for the primacy of political rights,
New Republic 31, 32-33 (Jan 10 & 17, 1994).
2 5 USC §§ 551 et seq (1994).
' For a classic statement, see James M. Landis, The Administrative Process (Green-
wood 1974).
Exec Order No 12291, 3 CFR 127 (1981).
5 Exec Order No 12866, 3 CFR 638 (1993).
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Nor has the national legislature refused to reexamine the
legacy of the New Deal. In 1994 and 1995, Congress devoted a
good deal of attention to the costs and benefits of government
regulation. Before long, it may enact a "supermandate" requiring
cost-benefit balancing from all agencies.' In the near future,
Congress may well enact legislation that is a mixture of a new
Administrative Procedure Act and an Administrative Substance
Act.7 Such legislation may ultimately be seen as part of a "con-
stitutional moment" involving large-scale revision of fundamental
national commitments.8
If such a revision does occur, it will be partly a product of an
immense wealth of new learning about the nature and perfor-
mance of the regulatory state. This learning has emphasized the
need for better priority setting,9 for more flexible tools,'0 for bal-
ancing rather than absolutism," and for closer attention to the
unanticipated adverse effects of regulation.' These points do
not suggest that the regulatory state has failed. In many areas,
things are much better because of regulatory initiatives." But
with better strategies and tools, existing pathologies could be
sharply reduced, thus saving many billions of dollars and many
lives in the process. For example, a recent study suggests that
better allocations of existing health expenditures could save an
additional sixty thousand lives with no additional cost-and that
' See HR 9, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 4, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec H2607-36 (Mar 3,
1995); HR 1022, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 23, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec H2261-67 (Feb 27,
1995); S 343, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 2, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec S8795-8806 (June 21,
1995). HR 1022 is incorporated in HR 9, which is the House version of S 343.
Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48
Stan L Rev 247, 268, 307-09 (1996).
8 See id at 247.
9 See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation
19-21 (Harvard 1993).
1 See Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:
The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 Colum J Envir L 171 (1988).
" See Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do Government's Numbers Tell Us?,
in Robert W. Hahn, ed, Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results From Regu-
lation (forthcoming Oxford 1996).
' See, for example, W. Kip Viscusi, John M. Vernon, and Joseph Harrington, Jr.,
Economics of Regulation and Antitrust 705-06 (MIT 2d ed 1995). For a discussion of
regulatory strategies that achieved ends directly opposed to those intended, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U Chi L Rev 407 (1990).
" See generally the discussion of regulatory successes in Gregg Easterbrook, A
Moment on the Earth: The Coming Age of Environmental Optimism (Viking 1995). For an
overview, see John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs,
in John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener, eds, Risk versus Risk: Tradeoffs in
Protecting Health and the Environment 1, 6-10 (Harvard 1995).
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with better allocations, we could prevent the same number of
deaths we now prevent with $31 billion in annual savings.'4
During the twentieth-century explosion in regulatory activi-
ty-including the New Deal and the "rights revolution" of the
1960s and 1970s-there was no effort to create a general mecha-
nism for monitoring regulatory performance. But with new em-
pirical studies of the effects of regulation, it is now clear that the
national government has failed adequately to perform the tasks
assigned to it and that it has sometimes made things worse.
Increasingly it is asked whether the costs of regulation justify the
benefits. Hence assessment of regulatory performance has in-
creasingly taken the form of the criterion of cost-benefit analysis,
and hence the American administrative state is increasingly
becoming a cost-benefit state. This is so despite the fact that
there is much controversy about how to value and characterize
both costs and benefits.' 5
My purpose in this Essay is to discuss a pervasive problem
in risk regulation, one that helps account for regulatory failure,
that is an intriguing part of cost-benefit assessment," and that
is only now receiving public attention.'7 The problem occurs
when the diminution of one health risk simultaneously increases anoth-
er health risk. Thus, for example, fuel economy standards, de-
signed to reduce environmental risks, may make automobiles less
safe, and in that way increase risks to life and health." Regula-
tions designed to control the spread of AIDS and hepatitis among
health care providers may increase the costs of health care, and
thus make health care less widely available, and thus cost
lives. 9 If government bans the manufacture and use of asbestos,
" Harvard Group on Risk Management Reform, Reform of Risk Regulation: Achieving
More Protection at Less Cost 16 (Harvard 1995), citing Tammy 0. Tengs, Optimizing
Societal Investments in Preventing Premature Death (1994) (doctoral dissertation, Harvard
School of Public Health).
' See, for example, W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibili-
ties for Risk 17-98 (Oxford 1992); Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 190-
216 (Harvard 1993).
"6 Health-health analysis can also be seen as a substitute for cost-benefit analysis.
See text accompanying notes 60-67.
17 For the best general discussion, see Graham and Wiener, Confronting Risk Trade-
offs (cited in note 13). I owe a general debt to Graham and Wiener throughout.
"s See Robert W. Crandall, Policy Watch: Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards,
6 J Econ Persp 171, 178 (Spring 1992); Robert W. Crandall and John D. Graham, The
Effect of Fuel Economy Standards on Automobile Safety, 32 J L & Econ 97 (1989).
19 See American Dental Association v Martin, 984 F2d 823, 826 (7th Cir 1993)
("OSHA also exaggerated the number of lives likely to be saved by the rule by ignoring
lives likely to be sacrificed by it, since the increased cost of medical care, to the extent
passed on to consumers, will reduce the demand for medical care, and some people may
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it may lead companies to use more dangerous substitutes.0 Reg-
ulation of nuclear power may make nuclear power safer; but by
increasing the cost of nuclear power, such regulation will ensure
reliance on other energy sources, such as coal-fired power plants,
which carry risks of their own.2' When government requires re-
formulated gasoline as a substitute for ordinary gasoline, it may
reduce carbon monoxide emissions but produce new pollution
problems from hydrocarbons and smog.22 When government reg-
ulates air pollution, it may encourage industry to increase the
volume of solid waste, and in that sense aggravate another envi-
ronmental problem. A ban on carcinogens in food additives may
lead consumers to use noncarcinogenic products that carry great-
er risks in terms of diseases other than cancer."
The general problem is ubiquitous. It stems from the fact
that government officials, like individual citizens and the public
as a whole, suffer from both limited information and (even more
importantly) selective attention.' A large current priority is to
develop mechanisms that overcome the problems posed by the
fact that people-both citizens and regulators-tend to focus on
problems that are parts of complex wholes. Such a mechanism
should take account of Sen's point in the epigraph to this Essay.
Risks to life and health are qualitatively diverse, and because of
their origins and nature, some risks warrant greater attention
than others.
My goal here is to explore the relation between health-health
tradeoffs and the law, in an effort to see how governmental judg-
ments on this topic might be improved. I develop a simple frame-
work for deciding how regulatory agencies should approach such
tradeoffs. I suggest that this framework is complicated by refer-
ence to some peculiar features of individual and collective ratio-
nality in risk assessment.
lose their lives as a result.").
'o See Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA, 947 F2d 1201, 1220-30 (5th Cir 1991).
21 See Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy
Controversy, 91 Harv L Rev 1833, 1835-36 (1978). See generally Peter Huber, Electricity
and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory Authority, 100 Harv L Rev 1002 (1987).
' See Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in Michael S. Greve and Fred L.
Smith, Jr., eds, Environmental Politics: Public Costs, Private Rewards 19, 22-24 (Praeger
1992).
' See Richard A. Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation
of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaption to Scientific Progress?, 5 Yale J Reg 1, 60-
61 & n 306 (1988).
24 See Aaron Wildavsky, But is it True?: A Citizen's Guide to Environmental Health
and Safety Issues 1-2 (Harvard 1995); Howard Margolis, Dealing with Risk: Why the
Public and the Experts Disagree on Environmental Issues 5-20 (Chicago 1996).
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I also deal with the respective roles of courts, Congress, and
the President in managing health-health tradeoffs. I urge that
often agencies ought to be taken to have legal authority to make
such tradeoffs, and that they ought to exercise that authority
much more than they now do. To this end I argue for an interpre-
tive principle to the effect that agencies should be allowed to
consider health-health tradeoffs in the absence of a clear congres-
sional statement to the contrary. I also urge a modest but far
from trivial judicial role in requiring agencies to consider aggre-
gate rather than isolated risks. Thus I claim that agency deci-
sions that increase aggregate risk levels should be found arbi-
trary or capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.25
More generally, I urge that Congress should amend the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act ("APA") to require agencies to consid-
er ancillary risks and to minimize net risks. I also argue that the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") should see
the reduction of overall risk as one of its principal missions.
Much more than it now does, it should undertake a coordinating
function so as to ensure that this mission is carried out.
In these ways, I hope to connect the question of sensible
outcomes-outcomes that do not suffer from the problem of exces-
sively selective attention-with the subject of institutional de-
sign. A large problem for government institutions is to devise
systems to ensure that problems of myopia or selective attention
do not defeat regulatory regimes; the management of health-
health tradeoffs is an important part of that project.
Part II of this Essay provides a simple conceptual map, de-
signed to draw some relevant distinctions. Part III offers a first
approximation of an approach to health-health tradeoffs; this
first approximation is an effort to limit aggregate risks under-
stood in "expected value" terms. I then suggest that this approx-
imation must be qualified by reference to some complexities in
ordinary citizen judgments about risk. People care not simply
about how many lives are saved, but also about whether risks
are involuntarily incurred, especially dreaded, inequitably dis-
tributed, potentially catastrophic, faced by the current or by fu-
ture generations, and so forth. Reflective judgments of this sort
diverge from both expert and economic valuations, though in
interestingly different ways. These reflective judgments bear a
great deal on how we think about the "rationality" of risk regula-
- 5 USC § 706(2XA).
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tion. They also have consequences for the pervasive issue of
incommensurability in law.
Part IV deals with existing law, urging agencies to under-
take more health-health tradeoffs than they now do, and explain-
ing how a judicial role could encourage this to happen. Part V
deals with how Congress and the President might approach
health-health tradeoffs in a way that diminishes the problems
associated both with the "pollution of the month" syndrome and
with myopia or selective attention.
II. A POLEMICAL NOTE AND A CONCEPTUAL MAP
Discussions of the administrative state-and proposals for
improving it-fall into two general categories. Most familiar is
the traditional lawyers' approach, reflected in the Administrative
Procedure Act and in much of conventional administrative law.
Here we find a range of efforts to limit administrative discretion,
mostly through procedural requirements and judicial review. On
this view, the basic problem for the administrative state is the
exercise of policy-making discretion by unelected bureaucrats; the
basic solution is to reduce this discretionary authority."
The second approach is concerned with improving regulatory
performance by asking concrete questions about the effects of
regulation.27 On this view, administrative discretion is a prob-
lem only to the extent that administrative discretion produces
bad outcomes.28 And on this view, administrative law doctrines,
and reform proposals for the administrative state, should be
founded on a concrete understanding of what strategies will
make regulation work better by, for example, saving or lengthen-
ing lives, reducing cost, increasing employment, and improving
education.
In my view, lawyers have focused far too much and far too
long on the control of administrative discretion, and far too little
on the actual effects of administrative behavior on social well-
26 This approach sees the fall of the nondelegation doctrine as the basic problem and
attempts to provide surrogates for that doctrine. See, for example, David Schoenbrod,
Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation 155-91
(Yale 1994).
' See, for example, Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 9-10 (cited in note 9); Jerry
L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice 79 (Yale 1983); Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 149-50 (cited
in note 15).
' See Jerry L. Mashaw, Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J L
Econ & Org 81 (1985) (arguing that administrative discretion is likely to improve regula-
tory performance).
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being. For the future a critical question is the relationship be-
tween administrative law doctrines and those effects. If, for ex-
ample, administrative discretion is in some domain likely to lead
to better outcomes than legislative discretion-as is certainly
imaginable in technically complex areas, especially those involv-
ing the choice of means for achieving given ends-then there
ought to be at least a presumption in favor of administrative
discretion. Traditional lawyers might be tempted to reject such
discretion by reference to large-sounding abstractions involving,
for example, legitimacy, Marbury v Madison,29 or checks and
balances. But if an administrative law doctrine-involving, for
example, judicial deference to administrative interpretations of
law ---is likely to reduce overall costs and increase the rational-
ity of regulatory law, there is a good argument for that doctrine.
As the twenty-first century approaches, it is, in short, appro-
priate for administrative law to focus less on large-sounding
abstractions, usually rooted in a controversial understanding of
the Constitution, and more on questions that are at once more
concrete, more empirical, more manageable, and more directed
toward real-world consequences. And though I cannot support the
point here, I believe that such a shift would point toward new
ways of approaching a host of old questions.3' Let us turn, then,
to the important and pervasive issue of health-health tradeoffs as
a case in point, and see how administrative law might be revised
to deal with that issue.
A. Regulated and Ancillary Risks
To get a handle on the problem of health-health tradeoffs, we
need to make some distinctions. Call the risks that government is
trying to control the regulated risks. Call the risks that are in-
creased by regulation the ancillary risks.32
Ancillary risks take many different forms, depending on their
relationship to the regulated risk. We might say, for example,
that the increase in acid deposition is not within the same do-
2 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
See, for example, Chevron v NRDC, 467 US 837, 842-45 (1984).
31 For example, the issue of scope of judicial review might be examined largely by
asking about what kind of approach will reduce both costs of decision and costs of error.
Chevron itself could be examined under this rubric. The much debated line between
Londoner v Denver, 210 US 373 (1908), and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v State Board of
Equalization, 239 US 441 (1915), could be understood in similar terms.
Compare this with the discussion of target risks and countervailing risks in Gra-
ham and Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs at 1-2 (cited in note 13).
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main as the risks prevented by regulation of nuclear power
plants. This is true in two different ways, legal and factual. First,
and for many purposes most importantly, the law does not con-
sider them in the same domain. The agency that regulates one of
these risks, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), has no
authority to regulate the other, which falls under the jurisdiction
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"). A pervasive
problem in handling health-health tradeoffs stems from organiza-
tion charts that allocate authority to diverse agencies, frequently
in ways that make it difficult or impossible for agencies to coordi-
nate their responses.33
Second, the risks of acid deposition (mostly from coal-fired
power plants) have a different source from the risks created by
nuclear power plants as a simple matter of fact. This point sug-
gests that health-health tradeoffs will often require agencies to
compile extensive information, possibly in a way that will dwarf
existing capacities. Compare a situation in which the regulation
of sulfur dioxide emissions increases carbon monoxide emissions.
If this happens, we are dealing in any event with air pollution,
indeed air pollution from largely the same technologies, and the
EPA has the statutory authority to regulate both sources.
It is therefore possible to imagine a complex continuum of
relationships between regulated risks and ancillary risks. There
are, of course, differences among risks--differences of degree as
well as differences in kind-especially in the factual domain,
where there may or may not be an element of overlap between
relevant inquiries. And, of course, we might describe the domain
of the regulated risk in many different ways. For some purposes
the best way to define the risk domain is through the relevant
law, which, as we will see, sets constraints on the kinds of risk
that agencies may consider.
A well-functioning administrative state would seek a mea-
sure of coordination among agencies, so that an agency operating
in one domain does not inadvertently or unnecessarily increase
risks in other domains; and so that risk assessments are made as
globally as possible. As a threshold matter, agencies should at
the very least coordinate their efforts so as to reduce net or over-
all risks. But a special problem for coordinated responses is that
agencies have quite different standards for deciding when risks
require regulation.34 The International Commission on Radiolog-
See Part V for a discussion of suggested solutions.
See generally March Sadowitz and John D. Graham, A Survey of Residual Cancer
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ical Protection, for example, recommends that environmental
factors should not cause an incremental cancer risk, for those
exposed over a lifetime, of more than about three in one thou-
sand.35 But American agencies do not follow this recommenda-
tion. Indeed, their practices vary widely. The NRC sees one in
one thousand as acceptable; the EPA's acceptable range varies
from one in ten thousand to one in one million." The Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") has tried to use a standard of one
in one million, but under the Delaney Clause,37 courts have re-
quired a standard of essentially zero.38 The Occupational Safety
and Health Administration ("OSHA") has interpreted the "signifi-
cant risk" requirement found in its governing statute to mean a
risk of one in one thousand; labor groups have sought a change
to one in one million.39
These varying standards make performing health-health
tradeoffs a very complex matter. If one agency is using a stan-
dard of one in one thousand for risk A, and doing so lawfully,
how should it deal with an increase in risk B, when that risk is
regulated by a different agency operating lawfully under a dif-
ferent standard? Matters become even more complex when risks
from cancer are being compared with other sorts of risk.
I do not urge that judgments about significance must be
uniform. Contextual differences justify different judgments about
which risks warrant special concern.' But such judgments
should be made in a self-conscious and informed way, rather
than on an ad hoc basis. I return to this issue below.
There are many different mechanisms by which risk regula-
tion may increase aggregate risks.4' All of these mechanisms
have a degree of complexity, and hence collective judgments that
respond to them may well misfire. Consider the following:
-A regulatory ban may result in independent health risks
coming from ancillary "replacement" risks. If we ban substance
Risks Permitted by Health, Safety, and Environmental Policy, 6 Risk 17 (1995).
" Id at 18-19.
Id at 20.
' The Delaney Clause is three separate provisions prohibiting the use of any carcino-
gen in any food additive. 21 USC §§ 348 (cX3XA), 360b(dX1)(I), 379e(b)(5Xb) (1994).
' See generally Public Citizen v Young, 831 F2d 1108 (DC Cir 1987); Les v Reilly,
968 F2d 985 (9th Cir 1992). See also notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
' Sadowitz and Graham, 6 Risk at 24-25 (cited in note 34). See also Industrial Union
Dep't, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Inst., 448 US 607, 655 (1980).
See Part IH.C.
41 See Graham and Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs at 23-25 (cited in note 13);
Aaron Wildavsky, Searching for Safety (Transaction 1988).
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A, the replacement substance B may also be dangerous. If a car-
cinogenic substance is regulated, perhaps people will use a prod-
uct that is not carcinogenic but that causes serious risks of heart
disease.
-Regulation may produce a new, offsetting risk that is qual-
itatively similar to or indistinguishable from the target risk.
Perhaps regulation of certain substances that threaten to destroy
the ozone layer will produce new reliance on other substances
that also threaten the ozone layer.
-Regulation may force society to forego "opportunity bene-
fits." For example, the careful screening procedures that keep
drugs and services from prematurely entering the marketplace
may also deprive people of certain health benefits. This problem
has received recent attention with respect to the Food and Drug
Administration, especially with the "drug lag" and the agency's
efforts to control the spread of AIDS.42
-Regulated substances may create health benefits as well as
health risks. By eliminating those health benefits, regulation
may therefore create a net increase in health dangers.
-Regulation of one risk may protect a certain group of peo-
ple while imposing a new risk on another group. This would
happen, for example, if a ban on a certain pesticide protects con-
sumers, plants, and animals, but simultaneously increases risks
to farmers. Perhaps regulations protecting men from certain
risks will impose new risks on women.
-Most generally, the economic costs imposed by regulation
may create health risks, as I discuss below in Part II.B.
When officials think about health-health tradeoffs, the
distributional incidence of the ancillary risk may matter a great
deal for policy purposes. Sometimes the ancillary risk falls on the
same class of people as the regulated risk; sometimes the ancil-
lary risk burdens an entirely different group. This suggests that
risk redistribution, rather than risk reduction, is a possible goal
and outcome of regulation. Interest groups may well try to exploit
this possibility. Hence it should be expected that odd coalitions
will develop to reduce risks of a certain kind when the result is
to shift risks (and control costs) from some groups to others.'
42 A general description can be found in President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al
Gore, Reinventing Drug & Medical Device Regulations (US GPO 1995). See also Miranda
Perry, Health-Health Analysis and the FDA (unpublished manuscript on file with U Chi L
Rev).
4' See Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air: or How the
Clean Air Act Became a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-Out for High-Sulfur Coal Producers and
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B. "Richer Is Safer"
Thus far we have been discussing cases in which the act of
regulating one risk produces ancillary risks through a certain
causal chain. There is a particularly controversial possibility
here, one that has been receiving much recent attention. Regula-
tions cost money-sometimes a great deal of money-and private
expenditures on regulatory compliance may produce less employ-
ment and more poverty. People who are unemployed or poor tend
to be in worse health and to live shorter lives." If wealthy peo-
ple face diminished threats to life and health, and if poor people
face greater threats, might not costly regulation increase risks
simply by virtue of reducing wealth?
There are several reasons why this might be so.' First, peo-
ple with more wealth have more capacity to spend their income
on health-enhancing goods and activities. There is strong evi-
dence to this effect; for example, poor people have inferior hous-
ing and a lower rate of smoke detector installment, and this may
well be connected with greater death rates from fire." Second,
people who are poorer also suffer from various stresses that may
have adverse health effects. Stress itself can contribute to mor-
bidity and mortality; it can, for example, lead to an increase in
heart disease. Finally, greater social wealth seems to be associat-
ed with more general social changes in the direction of greater
safety, though the relevant mechanism is not well understood.
This possibility has been reflected in legal opinions, perhaps
most prominently in Judge Easterbrook's suggestion that a fetal
protection policy might "reduce risk attributable to lead at the
cost of increasing other hazards," including the hazards stem-
ming from less income, since "there is also a powerful link be-
tween the parents' income and infants' health."47 The more gen-
What Should Be Done about It 3541, 118-21 (Yale 1981); see also Adler, Clean Fuels,
Dirty Air at 19, 25-38 (cited in note 22).
See Wildavsky, Searching for Safety at 59-75 (cited in note 41).
See John D. Graham, Bei-Hung Chang, and John S. Evans, Poorer Is Riskier, 12
Risk Analysis 333, 333-35 (1992); Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill:
The Role of Health-Health Analysis, 22 Ecol L Q 729 (1995). See also the discussion of the
connection between income and longevity in Jean Drbze and Amartya Sen, India: Econom-
ic Development and Social Opportunity 59-61, 207-10 (Clarendon 1995). Dr~ze and Sen
show that per capita income is linked with longevity but also that fair distribution is
important, since a high per capita income that coexists with large pockets of poverty may
be accompanied by high mortality rates. Cross correctly emphasizes the importance of
distributional considerations and hence the connection between health-health analysis
and environmental justice. See Cross, 22 Ecol L Q at 762-64, 782-83.
Cross, 22 Ecol L Q at 733 (cited in note 45).
4 International Union, UAW v OSHA, 886 F2d 871, 918 (7th Cir 1989) (Easterbrook
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eral question is this: Would it be possible to make precise connec-
tions between governmentally required expenditures on risk
reduction with shifts in unemployment and poverty?
An incipient literature attempts to do precisely this. A 1990
study attempted to develop a model to quantify the view that
"richer is safer."' According to Ralph Keeney, a single fatality
might result from a compulsory expenditure of from $6.49 million
to $7.25 million; with different assumptions about the
distributional incidence of the costs, the estimate could range
between $3 million and $12 million.49 In a concurring opinion in
a 1991 case involving occupational safety and health regulation,
Judge Williams invoked this evidence to suggest that OSHA's
refusal to engage in cost-benefit analysis might not be beneficial
for workers." Judge Williams reasoned in the following way. If
a fatality results from an expenditure of $7.5 million, then some
regulations might produce more fatalities than they prevent.
Many regulations of course cost more than $7.5 million per life
saved. In Judge Williams's view, an agency that fails to measure
costs against benefits might be failing to measure mortality gains
against losses.
The claimed relationship between wealth reductions and
mortality is controversial,5' but a number of studies have found
such a relationship. There is a growing consensus, from diverse
studies, that regulatory expenditures can increase mortality.
Consider this summary:
dissenting), rev'd, 499 US 187 (1991). See also Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to
Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U Chi L Rev 1219, 1229-31 (1986) (discussing the same
point).
' Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 Risk
Analysis 147 (1990). See also Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by the Costs of
Regulations, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty 95 (1994); Aaron Wildavsky, Richer is Safer, 60 Pub
Interest 23 (1980); Wildavsky, Searching for Safety at 59-75 (cited in note 41).
49 Keeney, 10 Risk Analysis at 154-55 & table VI (cited in note 48).
International Union, UAW v OSHA, 938 F2d 1310, 1326-27 (DC Cir 1991). See also
Building and Construction Trades Department v Brock, 838 F2d 1258, 1267 (DC Cir 1988)
(suggesting that "leaning towards safety may sometimes have the perverse effect of
increasing rather than decreasing risk"). See also New York State Ophthalmological Socy
v Bowen, 854 F2d 1379, 1395 n 1 (DC Cir 1988) (Williams concurring) (arguing that
"extravagant expenditures on health may in some instances affect health adversely, by
foreclosing expenditures on items-higher quality food, shelter, recreation, etc.-that
would have contributed more to the individual's health than the direct expenditure
thereon").
"1 See Paul R. Portney and Robert N. Stavins, Regulatory Review of Environmental
Policy: The Potential Role of Health-Health Analysis, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty 111, 118
(1994) (arguing that adverse health effects from the cost of regulation are possible but
unlikely).
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Table 152
Study Data Implicit income Comments
gains necessary to
avert one death
(millions)
Keeney (1990) Used income and $12.3 Cited in UAW v
mortality correla- OSHA, as $7.25
tions from 1980 dollars;
Kitagawa and represents an
Hauser (1960) upper-bound
data, and others
Joint Aggregate U.S. $1.8 to $2.7 Reflects income
Economic income, employ- loss from
Committee ment, mortality recession of 1974-
(1984) and morbidity; 1975
1950-1980
Anderson and 4,878 male $1.9 (wages) $4.3 Older workers
Burkhauser workers over 10 (other income) aged 58-63;
(1985) years, 1969-1979 measured effects
of wages and of
value of one's
home on
mortality
Duleep (1986) 9,618 white $2.6 Controls for prior
married male disability, and
workers aged 35- educational
64 over 6 years, attainment
1973-1978
Duleep (1989) 13,954 white $6.5 Finds income
married male effects at all
workers aged 25- income levels
64 over 6 years,
1973-1978
Duleep (1991) 9,618 white mar- $3.9 Controls for prior
ried male workers disability, educa-
aged 35-64 over 6 tional attainment,
years, 1973-1978 and exposure to
occupational
hazards
1545
" The following table is borrowed from Randall Lutter and John F. Morrall, III,
Health-Health Analysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J Risk &
Uncertainty 43, 49 table 1 (1994).
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Wolfson 500,000 Canadian $6 Investigates
(1992) workers, over longevity rather
10-20 years than mortality;
finds income
effects at highest
quintiles of
income
National 1,300,000 $12.4 Estimate reflects
Institutes of Americans, all effect of income
Health (1992) ages, 1979-1985 changes on family
mortality; study
does not use
multiple regres-
sion, does not
control for prior
health status or
education
Chirikos and 5,020 men, aged $3.3 Uses two mea-
Nestel (1991) 50-64 studied sures of health
during 1971-1983 endowments
Chapman and 5,836 older men $12.2 Uses four distinct
Hariharan over 10 years controls for prior
(1993) health conditions
Graham, 38 years of age- $4 Distinguishes
Hung-Chang adjusted mortality effects of perma-
and Evans and income data nent income from
(1992) for the U.S. those of transi-
tional income
This point leads to a broader one with considerable implications
for law. Even if agencies are sometimes prevented, by law, from
measuring costs against benefits,53 perhaps they can compare
health losses with health gains, and conclude that some regula-
tions are not worthwhile because they cost lives in the aggregate.
In fact it can be shown that some regulations fail health-health
analysis whether or not they pass cost-benefit analysis. Thus we
might be able to agree that such regulations are counterproduc-
See, for example, Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill, 437 US 153, 172-88 (1978)
(holding that the Endangered Species Act prevented agencies from taking actions that
would lead to the extinction of a species, whatever the cost); Lead Industries Association u
EPA, 647 F2d 1130, 1148-51 (DC Cir 1980) (interpreting the national ambient air quality
standards under the Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7409 (1988), to prohibit consideration of
economic or technological feasibility in setting air quality standards); American Textile
Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v Donovan, 452 US 490, 509 (1981) (holding that cost-benefit
balancing under the OSHA toxic substances regulations would be inconsistent with the
statute, 29 USC § 655 (1988)).
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tive even if cost-benefit judgments seem too difficult or too con-
tentious. Consider the following table:
Table 2"'
Budgeted regulations Year Agency Status Cost per
life saved
(millions of
1992
dollars)
Regulations passing HHA vs. BCA
tests
1. Steering column protection 1967 NHTSA F 0.1
2. Unvented space heaters 1980 CPSC F 0.1
3. Cabin fire protection 1985 FAA F 0.3
4. Passive restraints/belts 1984 NHTSA F 0.4
5. Fuel system integrity 1975 NHTSA F 0.4
6. Trihalo-methanes 1979 EPA F 0.4
7. Underground construction 1989 OSHA-S F 0.4
8. Alcohol & drug control 1985 FRA F 0.7
9. Servicing wheel rims 1984 OSHA-S F 0.7
10. Seat cushion flammability 1984 FAA F 0.8
11. Floor emergency lighting 1984 FAA F 0.9
12. Crane suspended pers. platform 1988 OSHA-S F 1.2
13. Child sleepwear flammability 1973 CPSC F 1.8
14. Side doors 1979 NHTSA F 1.8
15. Concrete & masonry construction 1988 OSHA-S F 1.9
16. Hazard communication 1983 OSHA-S F 2.4
17. Asbestos 1986 OSHA-H F 2.8
18. Benzenelfugitive emissions 1984 EPA F 3.8
Regulations failing BCA test
19. Grain dust 1987 OSHA-S F 8.8
20. Radionuclides/ uranium mines 1984 EPA F 9.3
' Lutter and Morrall, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty at 59 table 6 (cited in note 52).
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Regulations failing HHA (and BCA) Year Agency Status Cost per
test life saved
(millions of
1992
dollars)
21. Benzene 1987 OSHA-H F 23.1
22. Ethylene oxide 1984 OSHA-H F 34.6
23. Uranium mill taildinactive 1983 EPA F 37.3
24. Acrylonitrile 1978 OSHA-H F 50.8
25. Uranium mill tailJactive 1983 EPA F 71.6
26. Asbestos 1989 EPA F 72.9
27. Coke ovens 1976 OSHA-H F 83.4
28. Arsenic 1978 OSHA-H F 125.0
29. DES (cattlefeed) 1979 FDA F 178.0
30. Arsenic/glass manufacturing 1986 EPA F 192.0
31. Benzene/storage 1984 EPA R 273.0
32. Radionuclides/DOE facilities 1984 EPA R 284.0
33. Radionuclides/elim. phos. 1984 EPA R 365.0
34. Acrylonitrile 1978 OSHA-H R 416.0
35. Benzeneethylbenzenestyrene 1984 EPA R 652.0
36. Benzene/maleic anhydride 1984 EPA R 1,107.0
37. Formaldehyde 1987 OSHA-H F 119,000.00
The idea that "richer is safer" has started to affect public
deliberations about risk. In a now celebrated letter written in
1992, James MacRae, the Acting Administrator of OIRA, wrote to
the Department of Labor questioning a proposed regulation of air
contaminants in the workplace.55 OSHA had estimated savings
of between eight and thirteen lives per year, at an annual cost of
$163 million. MacRae suggested that there was a significant gap
in OSHA's analysis: If a statistical fatality is produced by an ex-
penditure of $7.5 million, the regulation could actually cause
' See Keeney, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty at 96 (cited in note 48), discussing letter from
James B. MacRae, Jr., Acting Administrator and Deputy Administrator, Office of Informa-
tion and Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Office of Management and Budget, to U.S. Department
of Labor (Mar 10, 1992).
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twenty-two additional deaths. MacRae asked OSHA to investi-
gate the relation between health, wealth, and safety. OSHA re-
sponded that existing data to the effect that "richer is safer"
seemed highly speculative, but it did call for more comments
from the public."6
Eventually, a public outcry forced OIRA to retreat. Senator
Glenn in particular complained of OIRA's "Alice-in-Wonderland
type claim that health and safety regulations cause harm to
workers" and objected that the "richer is safer" view "seems to
stand logic on its head-to say that controlling a dangerous sub-
stance in the workplace makes an increased health hazard to the
worker.""7 Despite the public outcry, further research on the is-
sue suggests that lives can indeed be lost through required regu-
latory expenditures. At a minimum government ought to consider
the problem seriously.
If officials are to consider the fact that "richer is safer," it is
important to know whether the burdens of regulation fall on
those who are poor and near poor or those who are rich. Simple
intuition suggests that a loss in income from relatively poor peo-
ple will have more severe health effects than a similar loss from
the relatively well off. A recent study confirms the intuition." It
suggests that when program costs are borne exclusively by the
richest 20 percent of the population, mortality effects are one-half
as high as when program costs are borne exclusively by the poor-
est 20 percent of the nation.59 Thus it is necessary to know the
distributional incidence of costs in order to see the extent to
which "richer is safer."
C. Why Does It Matter?
We have now seen enough to know that an impressive body
of work attempts to measure health gains from regulation
against health risks from regulation. But why should we focus on
this particular question? Would it not be better to attend to the
overall gains from regulation and to the overall losses from reg-
' Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Air Contaminants, 57 Fed Reg
26002, 26005-09 (1992).
"' Keeney, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty at 96 (cited in note 48), quoting News Release
from Senator John Glenn (Mar 19, 1991).
' See Kenneth S. Chapman and Govind Hariharan, Do Poor People Have a Stronger
Relationship between Income and Mortality than the Rich?: Implications of Panel Data for
Health-Health Analysis, 12 J Risk & Uncertainty 51, 58-61 (1996).
' Id at 59. On the need to consider the distributional incidence of compulsory regula-
tory expenditures, see Cross, 22 Ecol L Q at 762-64 (cited in note 45).
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ulation? Cost-benefit analysis is receiving considerable attention
in both agencies 0 and Congress,6 and cost-benefit analysis,
properly conceived, takes account of all of the health-related ef-
fects of regulation. Health-health assessments focus on a subset
of effects, and refuse to translate those effects into dollars. Such
assessments ignore all costs unrelated to mortality and morbidi-
ty. But what is special about health-health tradeoffs? Why should
analysis focus on such tradeoffs rather than on all relevant ef-
fects?
Part of the answer lies in existing public judgments, taken as
simple brute facts. People seem to think that regulation is bad if
it causes more deaths than it prevents; a demonstration that a
particular regulation has this effect would count strongly against
its adoption. But people do not always know how to compare
health gains (fifteen lives gained, for example) with monetary
losses (an expenditure of $15 million, for example). This uncer-
tainty stems partly from the fact that lives and dollars are not
easily made commensurable,62 and partly from the fact that the
appropriate amount to spend on protection of a (statistical) life
depends very much on context.
A deliberative judgment about how to assess net health
tradeoffs is easier to reach than a deliberative judgment about
how to assess cost-benefit tradeoffs. It may thus be possible to
obtain an incompletely theorized agreement 63-- incompletely the-
orized in the sense that people from diverse theoretical perspec-
tives can agree-that a net mortality loss is bad. Incompletely
theorized agreements on particular results are an important part
of democratic deliberation; they are a distinctive solution to the
problems of social pluralism and disagreement.
See, for example, Exec Order No 12866, 3 CFR at 638 (cited in note 5).
61 See Sunstein, 48 Stan L Rev at 269-86 (cited in note 7). For a valuable overview,
see Hahn, Regulatory Reform (cited in note 11) (finding that about half of government
regulations since 1990 would not pass a cost-benefit test).
' I am therefore rejecting the suggestion in Graham and Wiener that the problem of
incommensurability stems from current methods of comparison: 'iI]t is chiefly our lack of
methods of comparison-of ways of seeing commonality among these risks-that makes
these risks seem 'dissimilar' or noncomparable, not an inherent incommensurability. As
we improve methods of risk analysis, the idea of calculating the 'net risk' of a risk portfo-
lio, or the change in net risk due to a risk tradeoff, may become more meaningful." Con-
fronting Risk Tradeoffs at 33 (cited in note 13). The problem of incommensurability stems
not from a lack of methods of comparison, but from human perceptions of qualitative
differences among diverse risks. Moreover, incommensurability need not be identified with
incomparability.
' See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv L Rev 1733
(1995).
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It would, however, be inadequate for present purposes to rely
on existing public judgments, which may be irrational or con-
fused. Perhaps public uncertainty about cost-benefit judgments
depends on an obstinate and counterproductive unwillingness to
acknowledge that even (risk to) life has its price and that risks
are matters of degree rather than "dangerous or not."'
But part of the answer can be found in information costs.
The comparative defect of health-health assessment is also its
virtue: it involves only a subset of the consequences of regulating.
Fewer facts need to be compiled. The assessment may economize
on the costs of inquiry into speculative issues about regulatory
consequences.
Another part of the answer may lie in attending more closely
to problems of incommensurability. We might understand
incommensurability to arise when no single metric is available by
which to assess the variables at stake in a social decision.65 In
the area of risk regulation, a single metric is troublesome simply
because it blurs qualitative distinctions. The vice and virtue of
cost-benefit analysis is that it attempts to provide such a metric.
If all effects are reduced to the metric of dollars, it may be pos-
sible to make simple assessments, in the sense that comparisons
and hence tradeoffs can become easier. But the reduction of mor-
tality and morbidity effects to dollars can erase important quali-
tative distinctions among diverse risks. These qualitative distinc-
tions matter, and hence it is important for officials to understand
them when they make decisions.
It is in the face of qualitative distinctions-distinctions in
how, not simply how much, things are valued-that participants
in democratic deliberation often resist a metric of dollars. To say
this is not to say that there is a problem of incomparability or
that tradeoffs do not have to be made among qualitatively di-
verse goods. But perhaps people can make choices more easily
when the tradeoffs involve things that may seem qualitatively
indistinguishable, like lives, rather than qualitatively diverse
things, like lives and dollars. Most simply, when it is hard to
trade off lives against dollars, the burdens of judgment might be
eased when we are trading off lives against lives. A judgment of
' On people's reluctance to acknowledge this, see Donald A. Redelmeier, Paul Orzin,
and Daniel Kaneman, Understanding Patients' Decisions: Cognitive and Emotional
Perspectives, 270 JAMA 72, 72-73 (July 7, 1993).
' See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich L Rev
779, 795-99 (1994).
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this kind undoubtedly underlies the interest in health-health
analysis.
There is considerable truth to this suggestion. But it is a bit
too crude. As we shall see, lives are themselves not commensura-
ble, in the sense that a single metric--lives saved"-is itself too
coarse-grained to account for people's considered judgments. We
do not reason well if we think that two lives should always be
traded for, say, two and a half lives. A great deal depends on the
context in which those statistical lives are put at risk (and on
what those lives would be like).66 For this reason problems of
incommensurability cannot be eliminated so easily. They play a
large role in health-health comparisons too.
What solutions are possible? It may be possible to reduce
these problems by looking not at total lives lost or gained, but at
the effects of regulation on the number of quality-adjusted life
years." A regulation that saves thirteen children while jeopar-
dizing fifteen elderly people may well be worthwhile, at least if
the thirteen children are likely to have decent life prospects. Gov-
ernment might thus focus on statistical years rather than statis-
tical lives. Through attending to years rather than lives saved,
and also by making judgments about the nature of years saved,
problems of incommensurability can be reduced though certainly
not eliminated.
III. INCORPORATING HEALTH-HEALTH COMPARISONS
A. First Approximation
Let us try, in a simple, intuitive way, to identify the factors
that should enter into deliberative judgments about health-health
tradeoffs. Begin with a simple case in which the costs of informa-
tion and inquiry are zero. If this is so, all agencies should investi-
gate all risks potentially at stake. Agencies should always take
account of ancillary risks and always try to limit overall or aggre-
gate risks.
Of course the costs of investigation and inquiry are never
zero; to the contrary, they are often very high. We can readily
imagine that agencies could spend all their time investigating
ancillary risks and never do anything else-a disaster for regula-
tory policy.68 (This is a potential problem with cost-benefit anal-
See note 1 and accompanying text.
Richard Zeckhauser and Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives?, 40 L &
Contemp Probs 5, 11-32 (Autumn 1976).
' This may be the goal of some proposals for regulatory reform. See Sunstein, 48
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ysis: cost-benefit analysis may itself fail cost-benefit analysis-if
the costs of undertaking cost-benefit analysis are high and the
benefits lower.) When the costs of inquiry are not zero, the obli-
gation to inquire into ancillary risks might be a function of sever-
al factors. First is the cost of delay, understood as the cost of not
controlling the regulated risk until more information has been
compiled. To assess this cost, it is necessary to explore the seri-
ousness of the regulated risk and the length of time necessary to
investigate the ancillary risk. Second is the cost of investigating
the ancillary risk, where this cost is understood as a product of
the cost of compiling and evaluating the relevant information.
Third is the benefit of investigating the ancillary risk, with the
benefit understood as the likelihood of uncovering information
that might help to produce a different and better result.
Under this view, it is of course (and unfortunately) important
to know at least something about the possible extent of the ancil-
lary risk and the costs of discovering it. Hence there is a problem
of circularity: it is impossible to know whether to undertake
health-health analysis without first doing a bit of health-health
analysis, at least by making some initial judgments about the
ancillary risk-a risk that, by hypothesis, the agency has not yet
explored. Before the actual investigation has occurred, there will
be a good deal of intuition and guesswork; the full facts cannot be
known until inquiries have been completed, and the real question
is whether it is worthwhile to complete the inquiries or even to
embark on them.69
But even at an early stage, it is possible to know that some
ancillary risks are likely to be high, while others are likely to be
trivial or low. Moreover, some ancillary risks can be investigated
at low cost, while others depend on scientific and predictive judg-
ments that require enormous investments of time and resources.
There is an analogy here to the question of whether and when
agencies must explore alternatives under either the National
Environmental Policy Act or the APA. Here courts have indicated
that some, but not all, alternatives must be investigated, and the
outcome turns on considerations like those I have been discuss-
ing."° Of course, an agency might be reluctant to inquire into
Stan L Rev at 271 (cited in note 7).
' Compare Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v NRDC, 435 US 519, 551-55 (1978)
(holding that agency need not address every alternative, but only those realistically
available within the time frame of the proposal).
"' See id. See also William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law § 9.8 at 957-63 (West
2d ed 1994) (detailing judicial responses to Vermont Yankee).
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ancillary risks on the theory that, if it does so, it will be unable
to regulate the risk at issue within a reasonable period of time. It
seems clear that the extent and nature of the regulated risk are
crucial factors for those deciding whether to explore ancillary
risks.
On this simple, intuitive view, an agency might reason in the
following way: If it would be enormously expensive to investigate
whether fuel economy standards would really produce smaller
and more dangerous cars, if the fuel economy standards would
themselves do a lot of good, and if the likelihood of a high ancil-
lary risk seems small, then it makes sense to proceed with the
fuel economy standards without investigating ancillary risks."
On the other hand, it is easy to imagine scenarios in which inves-
tigation of ancillary risks would be reasonable and the failure to
investigate would be irrational. Thus, the National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration's ("NHTSA") actual posi-
tion with respect to fuel economy standards and safety is that the
ancillary risk is worth investigating. 2
Compare the question of how to handle ancillary risks creat-
ed by the prohibited manufacture of asbestos. One ancillary risk
arises because asbestos appears to be the safest and thus best
product for use in brake linings. Whether this is true, and how
serious the ancillary risk is, can be investigated at the present
time. But other ancillary risks involve the eventual substitutes
for asbestos in products for which no substitutes are now
available. On the view of the EPA, the ban on asbestos will force
technological innovation, producing new substances that do the
work now done by asbestos." This may be a reasonable though
speculative view. If so, the government has reason to regulate
asbestos now and to wait before evaluating the risks posed by
substitutes.
B. Existing Law and its Rationale
How should we understand existing law in light of this first
approximation? Congress has apparently forbidden health-health
analysis in many settings by directing agencies to focus on cer-
71 Compare this, however, with the EPA's position in Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA,
947 F2d 1201, 1220 (5th Cir 1991) (proceeding with a ban on asbestos despite the possibil-
ity of ancillary risk from substitutes on the theory that new substitutes will develop
because of the ban). See also note 73 and accompanying text.
72 See text accompanying notes 114-20
7' Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F2d at 1220.
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tain health problems to the exclusion of all others.74 Questions
naturally arise about what understanding, if any, accounts for
these prohibitions.
Some of the relevant statutes might be seen to reflect cate-
gorical, rule-bound judgments reflecting factors of the kind just
discussed. Congress might think, for example, that the NRC
should not ask whether regulation of nuclear power will cause a
shift to coal-fired power plants and thus aggravate the problem of
acid deposition (a) because the problem of unsafe nuclear power
is an especially urgent one and (b) because it would be very hard
for the NRC, given its limited budget and expertise, to make the
necessary extrapolations. Under the considerations I have dis-
cussed, Congress might plausibly exempt the NRC from the duty
of exploring ancillary risks, or even ban it from doing so.
Alternatively, the problems posed by ancillary risks might be
solved by a healthy division of labor. The problems posed by coal-
fired power plants are the EPA's responsibility. Any effects on
automobile safety that come from air pollution regulation produc-
ing smaller cars might be controlled by NHTSA. Perhaps NHTSA
has the authority to make sure that the ancillary risk does not
come to fruition. Perhaps the two agencies will coordinate their
efforts to ensure that aggregate risks are minimized. Or consider
the health risks from regulation inducing unemployment and
poverty. It might be thought that these adverse effects are or
should be addressed by other governmental institutions, includ-
ing those entrusted with the power to reduce unemployment and
poverty.
Of course there are serious problems with the division-of-
labor strategy. Coordination of risk regulation is difficult to
achieve, and in modern government, it has not been pursued in
any systematic way.7" In any case it would be extravagant to
suggest that a healthy division of labor accounts for existing
practice. If there were such a division of labor, agencies would
systematically respond to increases in ancillary risk created by
other agencies; but there is no evidence of such responses.
7' See note 53 and accompanying text.
75 However, some efforts at coordination are prescribed in Exec Order No 12866, 3
CFR at 638 (cited in note 5). For example, § 1(bX10) directs agencies to "avoid regulations
that are inconsistent, incompatible, or duplicative with its other regulations or those of
other Federal Agencies." Id at 640. Similarly, § 2(b) emphasizes that the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget ("OMB") is to review and coordinate all agency rulemaking, in part to
ensure "that regulations... do not conflict with the policies or actions taken or planned
by another agency." Id.
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Another explanation for why existing law makes relevant
some risks but not others points to the important role of interest
groups in the regulatory process.7 6 On this view, selective atten-
tion and disparities in regulatory strategies are attributable to
the fact that well organized groups are able to obtain legislation
in their interests and to fend off regulation that would be harm-
ful to their interests. It should be unsurprising that the statute
regulating agricultural practices allows for a form of open-ended
balancing;" the agricultural groups are in a good position to
fend off draconian legislation. Some environmental groups work
very hard to obtain severe restrictions on carcinogenic substanc-
es.
78
In fact, interest groups might work together so as to redis-
tribute risks, and the resulting coalitions might well ban agencies
from engaging in health-health analysis for fear that the result
will be decreased redistribution. If, for example, corn producers
attempt to obtain an ethanol requirement for gasoline, they will
not be disturbed to find that ethanol itself imposes environmental
risks. Or if it happens that electric cars produce environmental
hazards because of waste disposal problems, the redistribution of
the risk may not be bothersome to those who favor electric cars
on self-interested grounds. It would even be possible to imagine
cases in which the redistributed risk was affirmatively sought, if,
for example, those who face the new risk are competitors. Un-
doubtedly, an investigation of the political economy of risk regu-
lation would reveal many diverse cases in which interest groups
pursue their own interests rather than overall risk reduction.79
Other explanations would point to myopia, selective attention,
sensationalism, loss aversion, credit-claiming, and random agen-
da selection.0  Some statutes stem from sensationalistic
events-the Love Canal scare is one example of this tenden-
cy-that encourage legislators to hold hearings, enact legislation,
and claim credit for fixing problems that are either not very large
" See the discussion of "omitted voices" in Graham and Wiener, Confronting Risk
Tradeoffs at 34-36 (cited in note 13).
" The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") directs the EPA
to regulate pesticides that have "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment." 7 USC
§ 136a(a) (1994). FIFRA defines these "unreasonable effects" to include "any unreasonable
risk... taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of
the use of any pesticide." 7 USC § 136(bb) (1994).
78 For a discussion of health-health tradeoffs under the Delaney Clause, see Merrill, 5
Yale J Reg at 74-88 (cited in note 23).
,9 See note 22.
'o These are important points in Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle (cited in note 9).
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or that are just a part of a complex whole. Such statutes are
likely to reflect myopia or selective attention.8' The result may
well be a form of random agenda selection that bans health-
health tradeoffs, that does not adequately reduce risks, or that
even increases some risks. Moreover, people are pervasively
averse to losses from the status quo-more so than they are fa-
vorably inclined to improvements from the status quo--and loss
aversion may account for apparently irrational judgments about
how to trade off health risks.
Finally, some statutes might reflect public judgments about
how to conduct health-health tradeoffs. Perhaps the public be-
lieves that an increase in a certain risk is not a relevant factor in
the assessment of another risk. This could be a product of simple
confusion, as in the well-established refusal, on the part of some
of the public some of the time, to acknowledge any need for
tradeoffs.' Such judgments should not be given any weight in
law. Nevertheless, Congress, responsive as it is to the wishes of
the electorate, appears to disagree with this proposition. Or pub-
lic judgments might be based on heuristics of certain kinds, pro-
ductive of errors," or on gripping anecdotes that make draconi-
an regulation of a certain risk seem quite sensible. In these
ways, public judgments could be confused; we might prefer a
form of expert judgment that would produce more in the way of
regulatory rationality.85
These judgments might, however, result from something
other than confusion. They might depend on judgments about
sensible regulatory priorities and about qualitative differences
among risks. I take up this point below.
C. Incorporating Complexities
Our first approximation has suggested that all risks should
be aligned along a single metric-expected annual deaths, aggre-
gate mortality benefits-and hence measured against each other.
Both expert and economic approaches attempt to do this, though
in interestingly different ways. Experts tend to look at expected
81 Wildavsky, But is it True? (cited in note 24), is a set of variations on this theme.
' See Roger G. Noll and James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology
for Risk Regulation, 19 J Legal Stud 747, 752-72 (1990).
' See Sarah Lichtenstein, et al, When Lives Are In Your Hands: Dilemmas of the
Societal Decision Maker, in Robin M. Hogarth, ed, Insights in Decision Making: A Tribute
to Hillel J. Einhorn 91, 95 (Chicago 1990).
See Noll and Krier, 19 J Legal Stud at 748-72 (cited in note 82).
See Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 59-61 (cited in note 9).
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annual deaths and to assess risks accordingly.86 But ordinary
people base their judgments on something quite different. They
look, for example, at whether the risk is faced voluntarily or
involuntarily; whether it is distributed equitably; whether it is
faced by future generations; whether it is potentially catastroph-
ic; whether it involves a type of death that is especially dreaded;
and whether it is new and poorly understood. Consider the fol-
lowing summary:
Table 3
Risk characteristic Aggravating factor Mitigating factor
nature of risk dreaded acceptable
permanence irreversible/uncontrollable reversible/controllable
duration faced by future generations faced by those now living
equity unfairly distributed fairly distributed
source of risk man-made found in nature
freedom voluntarily incurred forced exposure
existing understanding known to science unknown
relation to status quo new old
If aggravating and mitigating factors are taken into account,
it might well be the case that people would find, say, 300 cases of
cancer less acceptable than 350 cases of heart disease, given cer-
tain assumptions about what causes each. In contingent valua-
tion studies, people purport to be willing to pay far more to pre-
vent cancer deaths (from $1.5 million to $9.5 million) than they
would to prevent unforeseen instant deaths (from $1 million to
$5 million).87 It is similarly possible that people might therefore
accept a regulated risk involving 100 annual fatalities even if the
ancillary risk involves 110 annual fatalities; perhaps the ancil-
lary risk is less severe because it is voluntarily run, not especial-
' See Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, and Sarah Lichtenstein, Characterizing Per-
ceived Risk, in Robert W. Kates, Christoph Hohenemser, and Jeanne Y. Kasperson, eds,
Perilous Progress: Managing the Hazards of Technology 91, 112 (Westview 1985); Richard
H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U Chi L Rev 1, 36-
39, 55-58 (1995).
' See George Tolley, Donald Kenkel, and Richard Fabian, State-of-the-Art Health
Values, in George Tolley, Donald Kenkel, and Richard Fabian, eds, Valuing Health for
Policy 323, 341-42 & table 15.5 (Chicago 1994).
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ly dreaded, and well understood. The democratic decision to look
at something other than quantity is easy to defend. It is filly ra-
tional.
We come, then, to a complication for the initial approxima-
tion: risks should be evaluated in accordance with the various
qualitative factors deemed relevant by ordinary people who are
evaluating risk.88 Of course, it would be possible to assign num-
bers to these factors if this step aided analysis.
Economic approaches promise to avoid some of the problems
of expert valuations. Most important, private willingness to pay
should incorporate some or even all of the factors that underlie
ordinary lay judgments. It might be possible to ascertain private
willingness to pay from studies of actual market behavior and
from contingent valuation studies.89 And from these results it
would be possible to derive the diverse valuations of diverse so-
cial risks. Consider the following table:
Table 4: Mortality Values by Cause of Death90
Category (per statistical life) Value Estimates in Million $
Low, Medium, High
Category Low Medium High
Unforeseen instant death 1 2 3
Asthma/bronchitis 1.3 2.5 5.5
Heart disease 1.25 2.75 6
Emphysema 1.4 3.5 9
Lung cancer 1.5 4 9.5
8 This proposition is defended in detail in Pildes and Sunstein, 62 U Chi L Rev at
55-95 (cited in note 86). Some complications are discussed in Cass R. Sunstein, Which
Risks First?, 1997 U Chi Legal F (forthcoming 1997) (on file with U Chi L Rev) (exploring
problems in ordinary valuations and arguing that voluntariness and control should not be
taken as clear categories, but as pointing to low costs of risk avoidance).
' See Tolley, Kenkel, and Fabian, State-of-the-Art Health Values at 323-44 (cited in
note 87); Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 34-74 (cited in note 15).
' Tolley, Kenkel, and Fabian, State-of-the-Art Health Values at 342 table 15.5 (cited
in note 87).
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There are, however, enormous difficulties in the idea that
officials can get, from private willingness to pay, an adequate
sense of how to order the risks at stake in regulation. Health-
health tradeoffs cannot easily be based on surrogates for market
valuation. Actual choices are "noisy"; from a market decision-to
take a job, to buy a Volvo, to get a smoke alarm-it is not easy to
derive a consistent valuation of life. Such decisions are highly
geared to the context in which they are made; it is not clear that
one can infer from actual choices in one context people's valua-
tions about other choices in different contexts.
Contingent valuation studies can build in a sense of context,
but the answers may not be reliable. They may well be a product
of strategic behavior, of questions and answers not thought
meaningful in real life, or of a perceived purchase of moral satis-
faction rather than any commodity. Valuation is greatly affected
by whether the good is offered alone or in connection with other
goods. Wildly different responses can be elicited depending on the
sequence of questions; and people often give the same amount to
reflect their willingness to save twenty thousand or two million
members of a certain species." In any case, democratic choices
should reflect a process of reason-giving in which it is asked what
policies are best to pursue, rather than a process of preference-
satisfaction in which each person is asked how much he is willing
to pay for a certain result.92 Deliberative outcomes should not be
confused with aggregated willingness to pay.
Government officials must, in these circumstances, proceed
pragmatically and experimentally, perhaps by taking aggregate
numbers based on expert judgments as a starting point, focusing
on number of quality-adjusted life years saved rather than sim-
ply lives saved, and invoking the supplemental considerations
involving democratic convictions that I have described here.
IV. COURTS AND EXISTING LAW
I now turn to existing law. If an agency takes account of
ancillary risks, has it behaved unlawfully? If an agency refuses to
consider such risks, should courts require it do so?
" See Richard B. Stewart, Liability for Natural Resource Injury: Beyond Tort, in
Richard L. Revesz and Richard B. Stewart, eds, Analyzing Superfund: Economics, Science,
and Law 219, 236 (Resources for the Future 1995).
' See Amartya Sen, Rationality and Social Choice, 85 Am Econ Rev 1, 15-18 (1995);
Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics at 197-216 (cited in note 15).
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A. Voluntary Agency Consideration of Ancillary Risks
Suppose first that an agency actually considers health-health
tradeoffs. Is it permitted to do so under existing law? Agencies
have considerable flexibility here, since under current doctrine,
agencies have discretion to interpret ambiguities in their govern-
ing statutes as they see fit.93 If the governing statute is ambigu-
ous, agencies should be permitted to consider health-health
tradeoffs.
Sometimes, however, statutes are unambiguous on this
point, and ancillary risks are excluded as reasons for regulatory
action or inaction. Under the Delaney Clause,94 for example, the
FDA is generally believed to be banned from considering the
possibility that the exclusion of foods with carcinogens will in-
crease risks from heart disease. The FDA is apparently prohibit-
ed from considering this or any other ancillary risk.95 A similar
problem arises under the toxic substances provision of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act, which probably bans OSHA from
asking whether richer is safer, or even from balancing workplace
risks against ancillary risks created by regulation.96
But sometimes agencies are given sufficiently broad authori-
ty, and they may, if they choose, consider ancillary risks. For
example, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA") provides that agencies must ask whether pesticides
produce "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment,"97
and this term requires the agency to take "into account the eco-
nomic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of
any pesticide." 8 Thus FIFRA certainly authorizes the EPA to
consider the possibility that a regulation will create aggregate
harms. The Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA") reads in simi-
lar terms.99 The Clean Air Act allows the government to consid-
er a broad range of good and bad environmental effects in requir-
" See Chevron v NRDC, 467 US 837, 842-45 (1984) (holding that courts should defer
to reasonable agency interpretations whenever statutory language is ambiguous).
21 USC §§ 348(cX3XA), 360b(dX1XI), 379e(bX5XB).
See Public Citizen v Young, 831 F2d 1108, 1117-18 (DC Cir 1987); Les v Reilly, 968
F2d 985, 988-90 (9th Cir 1992).
" On the other hand, it should be lawful to weigh health risks in the allocation of en-
forcement priorities.
7 USC § 136a(a).
7 USC § 136(bb).
99 15 USC §§ 2601(c), 2605(a), 2605(c)c(1)(C) (1994). See also Corrosion Proof Fittings
v EPA, 947 F2d 1201, 1214-23 (5th Cir 1991) (explaining that under the TSCA the EPA
must consider effects on the environment, health, and the economy as well as the avail-
ability of substitutes).
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ing technologies to reduce air and water pollution."°° Outside of
the context of toxic substances, the Occupational Safety and
Health Act defines occupational safety and health standards as
those "reasonably necessary or appropriate" to the goal of ensur-
ing "safe or healthful employment and places of employment."'0 '
OSHA may reasonably decide that a standard is not "reasonably
necessary or appropriate" if the effect of the regulation is to lose
aggregate lives. It is permitted to consider the effects of regula-
tion in causing risks to life and health through poverty and un-
employment.
We might go further. As noted, courts generally defer to
reasonable agency interpretations of law. In addition, statutes
are generally interpreted so as to avoid absurdity, even in the
face of apparently clear text.' 2 For the modern regulatory
state, it would make sense for courts to adopt a new interpretive
principle to the effect that agencies are permitted to minimize net
risks to life and health, a principle that Congress can overcome
only with a clear statement to the contrary. This principle makes
particular sense in light of the fact that the agency is in the best
position to decide whether consideration of health-health trade-
offs would be feasible, or instead a barrier to successful imple-
mentation of the underlying statute. Compared with courts, agen-
cies are both technically expert and democratically accountable;
they are also in a uniquely good position to obtain a systematic
overview of the statutes they administer, and that position can
enable them to counteract unintended harmful consequences." 3
There is a pervasive choice, central to administrative law,
between comprehensive rationality on the one hand and limited
information on the other. If an agency tries to administer the
statute so as to move in the direction of comprehensive rationali-
ty by ensuring that ancillary health risks are considered, it
should be allowed to do so. Congress should not lightly or inad-
vertently be taken to have forbidden agencies from ensuring that
100 See, for example, 42 USC §§ 7411(a)(1), 7521(a)(3)(A) (1994).
101 29 USC § 652(8) (1994).
1"0 See, for example, Riggs v Palmer, 115 NY 506, 22 NE 188 (1889) (statute clearly
requiring execution of a testator's will is interpreted not to require execution if it would
benefit the testator's murderer); Church of the Holy Trinity v United States, 143 US 457
(statute clearly prohibiting the importation of any foreigners to perform "labor or service
of any kind" is interpreted not to apply to religious organizations or services).
10 See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum L Rev
2071, 2087-91 (1990).
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regulations do not create net harm and that they create the
greatest possible net benefit.
This idea casts some doubt on the courts' approach to the
Delaney Clause. In Les v Reilly, the EPA sought to create a de
minimis exception to the Clause insofar as it prohibits the use of
any food additive that has been found to "induce cancer." "' The
FDA had made a similar argument in Public Citizen v Young,
where the agency sought to exempt substances that created a
one-in-a-million lifetime risk of cancer-the same risk that would
be run if a consumer ate one peanut with the FDA-permitted
level of aflatoxins once every 250 days, and a risk less than one
two-hundredth the lifetime risk incurred by the average male
smoker.0 5 In both cases, the government urged in essence that
"de minimis non curat lex." But in Les, part of the EPA's ratio-
nale came close to a suggestion that the exception may well, on
balance, decrease risks to life and health. According to the EPA,
the Clause might allow substances on the market that are actu-
ally less dangerous than other substances that are permitted
because they do not concentrate in processed foods.
In neither case did the government seriously press the claim
that the Delaney Clause, if interpreted literally, would increase
health risks. Many people so urge."° If the government had
done so, and offered a convincing factual demonstration to that
effect, it should have been permitted to interpret the Clause so as
to decrease risk on balance. The practice of statutory construction
is pervaded by interpretive principles designed to give reason and
justice the benefit of the doubt.'7 To existing principles, the
courts should add a suggestion that if at all possible, statutes
will not be construed so as to block agencies from taking account
of health-health tradeoffs.' °8
10 968 F2d 985, 986 (9th Cir 1992).
105 831 F2d 1108, 1111 (DC Cir 1987).
'o See, for example, Merrill, 5 Yale J Reg 1 (cited in note 23).
For a catalogue of existing principles, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation 323-33 appendix 3 (Harvard 1994).
'08 The strongest argument to the contrary would borrow from the idea of the penalty
default in the law of contract. See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incom-
plete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87 (1989) (arguing for
"penalty default rules" that would manifestly not be what the parties would want in the
hopes of encouraging them to make their contracts explicit). Sometimes, rules of contract
law and statutory interpretation are designed to create incentives to force parties to speak
clearly. Perhaps a literal interpretation of the Delaney Clause would force Congress to
think in a more systematic way; perhaps an interpretive principle of the sort I have sug-
gested would decrease that incentive. It is unlikely, however, that penalty defaults work
very well in the context of statutory interpretation, and there is no good evidence that
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B. Refusal To Consider Ancillary Risks
Now suppose that an agency refuses to consider, or to make
decisive, the fact that its decision to reduce one risk increases
another risk. Perhaps a new regulatory initiative from the NRC
would increase the risks from coal-fired power plants. Is the
NRC's refusal to consider such risks unlawful? The first question
is whether the statute requires consideration of ancillary risks.
The second question is whether, if the statute does not do so, the
agency's decision is nonetheless arbitrary or capricious.
As we have seen, many statutes do not require agencies to
consider ancillary risks. In any case, courts defer to reasonable
agency interpretations of statutes,0 9 so in many instances the
agency will have the authority to decide whether to consider
ancillary risks. If the agency has the statutory authority not to
consider ancillary risks, it is unlikely, under current law, to be
held that its decision not to do so was arbitrary. The judgment
about arbitrariness should and probably would be based on a
framework like that set out in Part III above.11° In an extreme
case, failure to consider risks that are likely to be large, and that
are not terribly costly to investigate, might be seen as arbitrary
within the meaning of the APA."' Indeed, I believe, for reasons
to be elaborated shortly, that courts should be less reluctant than
they now are to find agency action arbitrary on this ground.
A great deal, of course, turns on existing information. When
the data about ancillary risks are speculative or unreliable, agen-
cies are probably not required to consider such risks." OSHA
could lawfully conclude-as it has in fact concluded"'-that the
evidence that "richer is safer" is too speculative to be used at this
literalism has led or is leading Congress to be more attentive to the problem of unin-
tended bad consequences.
" See Chevron v NRDC, 467 US 837, 842-45 (1984).
110 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v NRDC, 435 US 519, 549-55 (1978)
(holding that some but not all alternatives must be explored); Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 US 29, 46-57 (1983) (applying the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard).
. See NRDC v Morton, 458 F2d 827, 833-38 (DC Cir 1972) (finding Department of
Interior's environmental impact statement insufficient given the lack of investigation into
alternatives and environmental consequences when the proposed action had such a large
risk of negative environmental consequences). See also California v Block, 690 F2d 735,
765-69 (9th Cir 1982) (finding Forest Service environmental impact statement inadequate
for failure to consider viable alternatives).
" See Vermont Yankee, 435 US at 551-55 (reaching this conclusion for energy conser-
vation alternatives).
"' See note 56 and accompanying text.
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time. Its decision to this effect ought not to be found arbitrary or
capricious unless it can be shown that the evidence is in fact
solid and that the costs of incorporating it are reasonable. The
relevant provision of the statute-the "reasonably necessary or
appropriate" language-gives OSHA discretion to do with this
evidence as it chooses. Under FIFRA, by contrast, an agency that
fails to consider ancillary risks would probably be violating the
statute, at least on a showing that the ancillary risks are real
and the costs of investigation are not excessive.
Consider in this regard the principal case involving the issue
of health-health tradeoffs, Competitive Enterprise Institute v
NHTSA ("CE')."4 NHTSA establishes fuel economy standards;
in doing so, NHTSA is required to consider the issue of "feasibili-
ty." In deciding the question of feasibility, NHTSA has taken
account of passenger safety, including risks created by regula-
tion, and while there is a possible statutory issue here,"5 every-
one in CEI accepted NRTSA's views on this point. The question
in the case was whether NHTSA acted lawfully in refusing to
relax its fuel economy standards for certain model years. Auto-
mobile companies urged that relaxation was required in order to
save lives-because the existing standards would lead to "down-
sizing" and hence to smaller and more dangerous vehicles-and
they presented strong evidence to this effect.
The agency responded that this evidence was unconvincing
and that "domestic manufacturers should be able to improve their
fuel economy in the future by... technological means, without
outsourcing their larger cars, without further downsizing or mix
shifts toward smaller cars, and without sacrificing acceleration or
performance.""6 The court held that this explanation was inad-
equate. The agency failed to claim or show that manufacturers
would actually fail to downsize their cars. In any case downsizing
would be costly and that "cost would translate into higher prices
for large cars (as well as small), thereby pressuring consumers to
retain their old cars and make the associated sacrifice in safety.
14 956 F2d 321 (DC Cir 1992).
115 The relevant statute required NHTSA to promote fuel economy "to the maximum
extent feasible." 15 USC § 2002(a)(4) (1988), repealed by Pub L No 103-272, § 7(b), 108
Stat 1379 (1994). It is not clear that this provision allows NHTSA to consider safety
effects as part of its judgment about feasibility. Compare American Textile Manufacturers
Institute, Inc. v Donovan, 452 US 490, 509 (1981) (interpreting "feasible" in 29 USC §
655(b) as not requiring cost-benefit analysis).
n CEI, 956 F2d at 324, quoting NHTSA, Passenger Average Automobile Fuel Econo-
my Standard for Model Year 1990, 54 Fed Reg 21985, 21966 (1989).
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The result would be effectively the same harm that concerns
petitioners and that the agency fails to negate or justify.""7 The
court therefore remanded to the agency for a better explanation
or a change in policy.
On remand, the agency offered a somewhat better explana-
tion. NHTSA pointed to what it saw as the absence of clear indi-
cations that fuel economy standards had caused any manufac-
turer to price consumers out of the market for larger, safer cars.
NHTSA referred as well to an absence of manufacturer claims
about the specific design standards that would result from the
standards. The court found this explanation sufficient."' In do-
ing so, it applied a highly deferential standard of review.
In light of the record, however, and the predictable pressures
on an agency like NHTSA, the result in the case might well be
questioned. NHTSA may well suffer from a form of "tunnel vi-
sion," especially in dealing with fuel economy standards, for
which there is a powerful constituency."' The interests that
call for attention to ancillary safety risks are typically poorly
organized, and when the claims come from the automobile manu-
facturers, NHTSA may be too ready to distrust them. To say this
is not to say that NHTSA should be required to relax its fuel
economy standards. But it is to say that a demonstration of the
sort made by the automobile manufacturers might well serve as a
kind of warning signal to the court, requiring a solid response
from the agency. In CEI, the agency's response could not qualify
as solid, as the court itself, while affirming the agency, seemed to
suggest.
A promising model for the future is provided by an important
court of appeals decision holding that under a statute that re-
quired open-ended balancing of relevant factors, an agency was
required to ask whether the risks that would substitute for as-
bestos would lead to even greater risks.'2 Thus the court em-
phasized that asbestos was the safest material for brake linings
and that safe substitutes might not be found in other areas as
well. 12
The point I am making here might well be generalized.
Agencies ought to be required to show that they are doing more
'7 Id at 325 (citation omitted).
Competitive Enterprise Institute v NHTSA, 45 F3d 481, 484-86 (DC Cir 1995).
..9 See Robert W. Crandall, et al, Regulating the Automobile 117-54 (Brookings 1986).
"8 Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA, 947 F2d 1201, 1221-22 (5th Cir 1991).
1 Id at 1224. I do not mean to endorse the court's rejection of the EPA's effort at
technology forcing. See note 71.
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good than harm.' This does not mean that courts should en-
gage in independent review of agency judgments on this score.
But it does mean that courts should take a "hard look" at agency
decisions failing to undertake health-health comparisons.'
V. NEW INSTITUTIONS
A. Congress
In its present form, Congress is ill equipped to consider the
problem of health-health tradeoffs. Its committee structure en-
sures a high degree of fragmentation and does not allow for de-
liberation on such tradeoffs. On the contrary, that structure
makes ancillary risks difficult to evaluate or, much worse, to see.
Often ancillary risks are thought to be subject to the jurisdiction
of another committee, which means, in practice, that coordination
is extremely difficult. In these circumstances, I offer two simple
suggestions for legislative reform.
First, Congress should create a new legislative committee
entrusted specifically with the power to assess aggregate risk
levels, to compare risks, and to initiate revision of statutes that
increase net risks. This committee should have the authority to
introduce corrective legislation when a statute, or agency action
under a statute, has been shown to increase aggregate risks.
Congress's current efforts in this regard are far too modest.
Speaker Gingrich's introduction of a regular "Corrections
Day"' may provide some modest deterrence and offer protec-
tion against abuses, but it is far too irregular to provide the sort
of coordination that is needed. No institution in Congress is in a
position to ensure against selective attention in lawmaking; a
new committee could help solve this problem.
Second, Congress should address the problem of health-
health tradeoffs through a new directive in the Administrative
" See generally Edward W. Warren and Gary E. Marchant, "More Good Than Harm":
A First Principle for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 Ecol L Q 379
(1993).
'L For an early application of the "hard look" doctrine, see Scenic Hudson Preserva-
tion Conference v FPC, 354 F2d 608 (2d Cir 1965) (explaining that the court's duty is "to
see to it that the Commission's decisions receive the careful consideration which the
statute contemplates" and holding that the FPC had failed to compile a record sufficient
to support its decision).
' "Corrections Day" was suggested by Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich as a
separate calendar to "correct" ambiguous, arbitrary, or ludicrous laws and regulations.
See Establishing a Corrections Calendar in the House of Representatives, H Res 168,
104th Cong, 1st Sess (June 16, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec H6104-16 (June 20, 1995).
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Procedure Act. Notably, recent initiatives designed to require
cost-benefit balancing say almost nothing about this problem.
The principal exception is a House bill introduced in 1995, which
contains a subsection entitled "substitution risks." This subsec-
tion says that "[e]ach significant risk assessment or risk charac-
terization document shall include a statement of any significant
substitution risks to human health, where information on such
risks has been provided to the agency." '
But this is a strikingly modest initiative. It does not require
agencies to investigate ancillary risks on their own. Nor does it
say that agencies may not proceed unless the regulation yields
netbenefits. I suggest instead a new amendment to the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act: 'Agencies shall ensure, to the extent feasi-
ble, that regulations do not create countervailing risks that are
greater than those of the regulated risk." A modest forerunner of
this idea can be found in the "clean fuels" provision of the Clean
Air Act, which says that the Administrator of the EPA may not
prohibit the use of a fuel or fuel additive "unless he finds... that
in his judgment such prohibition will not cause the use of any
other fuel or fuel additive which will produce emissions which
will endanger the public health or welfare to the same or greater
degree than the use of the fuel or fuel additive proposed to be
prohibited." This idea should be generalized. The words "to
the extent feasible" are necessary because some investigations
are too costly and speculative to be worthwhile.
B. Executive Branch
OIRA has been entrusted with the power to coordinate regu-
latory policy and to ensure reasonable priority setting.2 In the
Clinton administration, OIRA appears to have become an adviso-
ry body, more limited in its power than it was in the Bush and
Reagan administrations. In view of the absence of good priority
setting, and the enormous room for saving costs and increasing
regulatory benefits, this is highly unfortunate.
1- HR 1022, § 105(4), in 141 Cong Rec at 12263 (cited in note 6). HR 1022 was incor-
porated into HR 9 with this language fully intact. See 141 Cong Rec H2623, H2633,
H2639 (Mar 3, 1995).
"' 42 USC § 7545(c)(2)(C) (1994).
See Exec Order No 12291 §3, 3 CFR at 128-29 (cited in note 4) (organization under
Reagan); Exec Order No 12866 §§ 4, 6, 3 CFR at 642-44, 644-48 (cited in note 5) (organi-
zation under Clinton).
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OIRA should see, as one of its central assignments, the task
of overcoming governmental tunnel vision, by ensuring that ag-
gregate risks are reduced and that agency focus on particular
risks does not mean that ancillary risks are ignored or increased.
This is a more modest and particularized version of Justice
Breyer's larger suggestion that OIRA should have a power to set
priorities by diverting resources from smaller problems to larger
ones.' It also fits with the emerging interest in "common sense
government."' No body in government is now entrusted with
the authority of ensuring that risk regulation is managed so as to
ensure global rationality and coherence. OIRA is well situated to
take on that role, at least by attending to the possibility that
regulation of some risks may make risk levels higher on bal-
ance.
130
CONCLUSION
On the fiftieth anniversary of the Administrative Procedure
Act, it would be far too simple to say that the administrative
state has been a failure. In many ways, it has been a substantial
success. Risks to safety and health are much lower than they
have been in the past, partly because of regulatory safe-
guards.'3' But current programs are far more costly, and far
less effective, than they should be. Reforms to the APA, as that
Act was originally envisaged, would be much too modest to pro-
vide adequate correctives. Existing difficulties cannot be solved
by weakening or intensifying standards of judicial review, or by
increasing or decreasing the procedures that are required before
agencies undertake regulatory action.
As the twenty-first century approaches, it is especially im-
portant to design regulatory institutions that counteract the
identifiable problems of modern regulation. These problems usu-
ally stem from selective attention in the form of inadequate con-
cern for setting priorities, for providing good incentives, and for
minimizing harmful side-effects. The relevant reforms would
See Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 59-72 (cited in note 9).
"' See Al Gore, Common Sense Government: Works Better and Costs Less (US GPO
1995) (Third Report of the National Performance Review).
130 See also the suggested role for the President's science advisor in integrating risk
management in Harvard Group on Risk Management Reform, Reform of Risk Regulation:
Achieving More Protection at Less Cost, 1 Human & Ecological Risk Assessment 183, 190-
93 (Amherst Scientific 1995).
" See the evidence in Easterbrook, A Moment on the Earth (cited in note 13); Gra-
ham and Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs at 6-10 (cited in note 13).
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justify an Administrative Substance Act of the general sort that
is receiving considerable current attention in Congress." 2
Among the principal side-effects, not well addressed in cur-
rent proposals or existing law, is the increased risk sometimes
produced by risk regulation. Selective attention of this kind is a
natural outcome of the cognitive limitations of human beings;
sometimes it is the product of self-conscious efforts by well orga-
nized private groups. In any case, selective attention can easily
be exploited by such groups intent on redistributing resources in
their favor. This is a significant problem, and through some sim-
ple steps, something can be done about it.
I have emphasized that tradeoffs among risks ought not to
be based on a unitary metric, for reasons of both law and basic
principle. Lives are not commensurable with costs; lives are not
even commensurable with lives. The context in which life is put
at risk matters a great deal. But tradeoffs must nonetheless be
made. The problem is that public institutions do not undertake
this task in a self-conscious manner. New institutions should be
designed so as to overcome the cognitive problems and to ensure
that the relevant tradeoffs are made in a way that entails more
knowledge and more deliberation. Above all, institutions should
be created to ensure that risk reduction is pursued more fre-
quently than risk redistribution. To accomplish this task, it is
necessary to take steps to limit the effects of myopia, selective
attention, and interest-group influence in the regulatory process.
I have suggested several possible steps. Under existing law,
agencies should often be understood to have the authority to
engage in health-health tradeoffs, and they should exercise that
authority far more often than they now do. Courts should play a
modest but catalytic role in encouraging agencies to increase
aggregate risk reduction. They should do so, above all, by adopt-
ing an interpretive principle authorizing agencies to perform
health-health analysis unless Congress has expressly forbidden
them from so doing. Congress should create a new committee
designed to rank risks and monitor risk regulation for overall
coherence; it should also add to existing legislation a general
requirement that agencies consider all risks, to the extent that
this is feasible. Finally, OIRA (or some similar institution) should
undertake the process of scrutinizing risk regulation to ensure
that agency action does not suffer from the kinds of tunnel vi-
" See S 343 and HR 9, discussed in Sunstein, 48 Stan L Rev at 269-86 (cited in note
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sion, and susceptibility to both anecdotes and interest groups,
that are exemplified by so much of modern risk regulation.

